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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Issues of legal ethics arose during the survey year in the usual
contexts of attorney discipline, malpractice, and ineffective assistance of
counsel. In a handful of cases, the Georgia appellate courts also dealt
with other issues related to legal ethics.
II.
A.

DISCIPLINARY CASES

Disbarments

The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred thirteen lawyers during the
survey period.' Unlike the disbarment decisions in several previous
years, there were no dissents from any of these decisions.2 Five lawyers
were disbarred as a result of criminal convictions.3 Three lawyers lost
* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of Sussex
(M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. In re Williams, 281 Ga. 558, 558, 640 S.E.2d 292,293 (2007) (per curiam); In re Hipe,
281 Ga. 557, 557, 640 S.E.2d 292, 292 (2007) (per curiam); In re Quay, 281 Ga. 549, 550,
640 S.E.2d 290, 291 (2007) (per curiam); In re Pronk, 281 Ga. 511, 511, 640 S.E.2d 32, 33
(2007) (per curiam); In re Halcomb, 281 Ga. 510, 510, 640 S.E.2d 31, 32 (2007) (per curiam);
In re Calugar, 281 Ga. 509, 510, 640 S.E.2d 32, 32 (2007) (per curiam); In re McElroy, 281
Ga. 317, 318, 637 S.E.2d 705, 706 (2006); In re Goldberg, 281 Ga. 168, 169, 635 S.E.2d 750,
751 (2006) (per curiam); In re Kaufman, 281 Ga. 58, 58, 635 S.E.2d 751, 751 (2006) (per
curiam); In re Strickland, 281 Ga. 56, 57, 635 S.E.2d 739, 739 (2006) (per curiam); In re
Culpepper, 281 Ga. 55, 56, 635 S.E.2d 756, 758 (2006) (per curiam); In re Wallace, 281 Ga.
7, 7, 635 S.E.2d 706, 707 (2006) (per curiam); In re Sisk, 280 Ga. 635, 635, 631 S.E.2d 662,
663 (2006) (per curiam).
2. , See id.
3. In re Hipe, 281 Ga. at 557,640 S.E.2d at 292; In re Quay, 281 Ga. at 550, 640 S.E.2d
at 290-91; In re Halcomb, 281 Ga. at 510, 640 S.E.2d at 31-32; In re Pronk, 281 Ga. at 511,
640 S.E.2d at 32-33; In re Calugar,281 Ga. at 509-10, 640 S.E.2d at 32.
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their licenses for violations of the rules governing their trust accounts.4
Two lawyers were disbarred for client neglect and abandonment.5 One
lawyer voluntarily surrendered his license for permitting an employee
to solicit business for him by telephone and in person,6 while another
was disbarred because he had been disbarred in another state.7
Another lawyer lost his license as a result of violating a variety of rules,
including Rule 1.3 (diligence),8 Rule 1.4 (communication), 9 Rule 1.15
(trust accounts), 10 and Rule 1.16 (withdrawal).1'
B.

Suspensions

The supreme court imposed fifteen suspensions (other than interim
suspensions) for a variety of offenses. 12 The majority of these decisions
were unanimous. Three decisions concerned lawyers who were appealing
felony convictions." Two others concerned the imposition of reciprocal
discipline on lawyers who had been suspended in other states. 4 Three
In In re
lawyers received suspensions for isolated infractions. 5

4. In re Williams, 281 Ga. at 558, 640 S.E.2d at 293; In re Goldberg, 281 Ga. at 169,
635 S.E.2d at 751; In re Wallace, 281 Ga. at 7, 635 S.E.2d at 706-07.
5. In re Kaufman, 281 Ga. at 58, 635 S.E.2d at 751; In re Strickland, 281 Ga. at 57,
635 S.E.2d at 739.
6. In re McElroy, 281 Ga. at 317-18, 637 S.E.2d at 706.
7. In re Sisk, 280 Ga. at 635, 631 S.E.2d at 663.
8. GA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.3 (2006).
9. GA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.4 (2006).
10. GA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.15 (2006).
11. GA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.16 (2006); In re Culpepper, 281 Ga. at 55-56, 635
S.E.2d at 757-58.
12. In re Walker, 282 Ga. 53, 54, 644 S.E.2d 860, 860-61 (2007) (per curiam); In re
English, 281 Ga. 896, 896, 644 S.E.2d 137, 137 (2007) (per curiam); In re Wilson, 281 Ga.
782, 782, 642 S.E.2d 806, 806 (2007) (per curiam); In re Johnson, 281 Ga. 674, 675, 641
S.E.2d 535, 536 (2007) (per curiam); In re Moody, 281 Ga. 608, 608, 642 S.E.2d 17, 18
(2007) (per curiam); In re Gbaja, 281 Ga. 659, 659, 641 S.E.2d 532, 533 (2007) (per curiam);
In re Maddux, 281 Ga. 607, 608, 642 S.E.2d 317, 317 (2007) (per curiam); In re Hamilton,
281 Ga. 556, 556, 640 S.E.2d 291, 292 (2007) (per curiam); In re Geary, 281 Ga. 554, 555,
640 S.E.2d 253, 254 (2007) (per curiam); In re Campbell, 281 Ga. 316, 317, 637 S.E.2d 705,
705 (2006) (per curiam); In re Cunningham, 281 Ga. 315, 316, 637 S.E.2d 704, 705 (2006)
(per curiam); In re Elkins, 281 Ga. 249, 249, 637 S.E.2d 399, 399-400 (2006) (per curiam);
In re Garfinkel, 281 Ga. 142, 143, 636 S.E.2d 543, 544 (2006) (per curiam); In re Mitchell,
280 Ga. 769, 770, 632 S.E.2d 649, 650 (2006) (per curiam); In re Lenn, 280 Ga. 633, 634,
632 S.E.2d 89, 90 (2006) (per curiam).
13. In re English, 281 Ga. at 896, 644 S.E.2d at 137; In re Campbell, 281 Ga. at 316,
637 S.E.2d at 705; In re Cunningham, 281 Ga. at 315, 637 S.E.2d at 704.
14. In re Wilson, 281 Ga. at 782, 642 S.E.2d at 806; In re Maddux, 281 Ga. at 607-08,
642 S.E.2d at 317.
15. In re Walker, 282 Ga. at 54, 644 S.E.2d at 860; In re Johnson, 281 Ga. at 675, 641
S.E.2d at 535; In re Gbaja, 281 Ga. at 659, 641 S.E.2d at 532.
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Johnson,16 Eric Robert Johnson II was suspended for thirty days and
received a public reprimand for accepting compensation to represent two
criminal defendants while he was working as an assistant public
defender."' Johnson also received a public reprimand for failing to take
reasonable remedial measures in another case when he learned his client
had testified falsely."' In In re Gbaja,'9 Femi Gbaja was suspended
for thirty-six months after taking $25,000 of client money and leaving
the country.2° Because he returned the money, cooperated with
authorities, and expressed remorse, the court suspended Gbaja instead
of disbarring him.2' In In re Walker,22 Monique Walker received a
120-day suspension and a public reprimand after she pleaded guilty to
the misdemeanor of filing a fraudulent federal tax return.23 Walker
had2 failed
to report as income $700 that her father's company had paid
4
her.

Three of the unanimous decisions for suspensions concerned lawyers
who committed serious violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct but did so while suffering from health issues.25 In In re
Lenn,26 the supreme court accepted the petition for voluntary discipline
of an eighteen-month suspension from Lisa Paige Lenn for using a
client's funds for her personal benefit and initially failing to return the
client's phone calls.2 ' The court accepted the attorney's assertion that
she was suffering from mental health issues at the time and noted that
28
Similarshe made full restitution and was sorry for her misconduct.

ly, in In re Moody, 29 Renate Downs Moody submitted a petition for
voluntary discipline for her misconduct in failing to pursue two matters
for clients and for appearing in court intoxicated."0 The court noted
that the attorney had diabetes and a bi-polar condition and that she

16. 281 Ga. 674, 641 S.E.2d 535 (2007) (per curiam).
17. Id. at 675, 641 S.E.2d at 535-36.
18. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 536.
19. 281 Ga. 659, 641 S.E.2d 537 (2007).
20. Id. at 659, 641 S.E.2d at 532-33.
21. Id.
22. 282 Ga. 53, 644 S.E.2d 860 (2007) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 54, 644 S.E.2d at 860.
24. Id.
25. In re Moody, 281 Ga. at 608, 642 S.E.2d at 17-18; In re Garfinkel, 281 Ga. at 143,
636 S.E.2d at 544; In re Lenn, 280 Ga. at 633-35, 632 S.E.2d at 90.
26. 280 Ga. 633, 632 S.E.2d 89 (2006) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 633, 633-34, 632 S.E.2d at 90.
28. Id. at 634, 632 S.E.2d at 90.
29. 281 Ga. 608, 642 S.E.2d 17 (2007) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 608, 642 S.E.2d at 17-18.
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consumed alcohol to medicate herself.3 1 The court suspended her for
six months with the added condition that she obtain a certification from
a psychologist or psychiatrist certifying that she has no impairment
affecting her ability to practice law.3 2 In In re Garfinkel,3 3 another
lawyer was suspended indefinitely for abandoning his practice and
moving to another state, allegedly as a result of severe depression.34
Four of the suspensions provoked dissents.3 5 In In re Hamilton,36
the special master found that attorney Hunter J. Hamilton wrote bad
checks on his trust account, commingled personal funds and client funds,
withdrew funds from the trust account that were not earned fees, and
failed to maintain proper records of his trust account.3 7 These were not
isolated incidents, as the attorney had "failed to adequately and properly
maintain his trust account for many years." 38
Hamilton failed to
submit to the bar an agreed upon audit of his account and was otherwise
uncooperative. 39 The court suspended him for one year, with conditions
on reinstatement.4 ° Justice41 Hunstein dissented because she would
have disbarred the attorney.
Justice Hunstein also dissented alone in two other cases.4 2 In In re
Mitchell,4 3 the supreme court suspended a lawyer after he neglected
four client matters while he was practicing law in Texas.44 Texas had
imposed a two-year suspension with a probated suspension of an
additional three years.45 The Georgia Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline in the form of a two-year suspension (Georgia does not
have probated suspensions).4 6 Justice Hunstein dissented, presumably

31. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 18.
32. Id.
33. 281 Ga. 142, 636 S.E.2d 543 (2006) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 143, 636 S.E.2d at 544.
35. In re Hamilton, 281 Ga. at 557, 640 S.E.2d at 292 (Hunstein, J., dissenting); In re
Geary, 281 Ga. at 555, 640 S.E.2d at 254 (Hunstein, J., dissenting); In re Elkins, 281 Ga.
at 249, 637 S.E.2d at 400 (Hunstein, J., dissenting); In re Mitchell, 280 Ga. at 770, 632
S.E.2d at 650 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
36. 281 Ga. 556, 640 S.E.2d 291 (2007).
37. Id. at 556, 640 S.E.2d at 291.
38. Id.
39. Id., 640 S.E.2d at 291-92.
40. Id., 640 S.E.2d at 292.
41. Id. at 557, 640 S.E.2d at 292 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
42. In re Elkins, 281 Ga. at 249, 637 S.E.2d at 400 (Hunstein, J., dissenting); In re
Mitchell, 280 Ga. at 770, 632 S.E.2d at 650 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
43. 280 Ga. 769, 632 S.E.2d 649 (2006) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 769-70, 632 S.E.2d at 650.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 770, 632 S.E.2d at 650.
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because she believed disbarment would have been more appropriate.47
The Justice also dissented in In re Elkins" when another lawyer was
suspended for ninety days for failing to cooperate with bar authorities.49 This lawyer had been disciplined on five previous occasions. °
Justice Thompson joined Justice Hunstein in one dissent from a
decision for suspension. 5 In In re Geary,52 a lawyer with three prior
disciplinary offenses received a one-year suspension for his actions in
two matters.53 In the first matter, the lawyer accepted representation
in a legal malpractice case after a disbarred lawyer told him about the
client and obtained the client's signature on a contract. The lawyer only
had telephonic contact with the client and was eventually ordered to
refund his $5,000 fee. In the second matter, the lawyer apparently did
not notify a client about a hearing, and the client's absence at the
hearing caused the client harm.54 Justices Hunstein and Thompson
would have disbarred the lawyer, but the supreme court accepted his
petition for voluntary discipline of a one-year suspension.55
C.

Other Discipline

The supreme court imposed other forms of discipline in nine other
cases.5" In In re Ranalli5 7 a lawyer received a letter of formal admonition as a result of being disciplined in Nevada. 5 The discipline in
Nevada resulted from several incidents in which trust account funds
were moved temporarily into the firm's operating account to meet

47. Id. (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
48. 281 Ga. 249, 637 S.E.2d 399 (2006) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 249, 637 S.E.2d at 399-400 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
50. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 399 (majority opinion).
51. In re Geary, 281 Ga. at 555, 640 S.E.2d at 254 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
52. 281 Ga. 554, 640 S.E.2d 253 (2007) (per curiam).
53. Id. at 555, 640 S.E.2d at 254.
54. Id. at 554-55, 640 S.E.2d at 253-54.
55. Id. at 555, 640 S.E.2d at 254 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
56. In re Johnson, 281 Ga. at 675, 641 S.E.2d at 536; In re Taylor, No. S07Y0646 (Ga.
Mar. 26, 2007) (order for public reprimand); In re Adkins, No. S06Y2140 (Ga. Nov. 20,
2006), reprintedin THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA'S

ANNUAL REPORT FOR OPERATIONAL YEAR 2006-2007 43-44 (2007) (order for Review Panel
reprimand); In re Syrop, No. S07Y0052 (Ga. Nov. 6, 2006) (order for Review Panel
reprimand); In re Wright, No. S06Y1749 (Ga. Oct 16, 2006) (order for Review Panel
reprimand); In re Goldberg, No. S06Y1895 (Ga. Oct. 2, 2006) (order for public reprimand);
In re Ranalli, No. S06Y1271 (Ga. Sept. 18, 2006) (order for Letter of Formal Admonition);
In re Davis, No. S06Y1436 (Ga. July 13, 2006) (order for Review Panel reprimand); In re
Harris, No. S06Y1158 (Ga. May 17, 2006) (order for Review Panel reprimand).
57. No. S06Y1271 (Ga. Sept. 18, 2006).
58. Id., slip op. at 3.
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expenses. Ironically, each time the firm moved those funds, which it
later replaced, the firm was actually entitled to move them as earned
fees.59 Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court imposed discipline,
and because there is no equivalent to that discipline in Georgia, the
supreme court issued a letter of formal admonition.6"
Five lawyers received Review Panel reprimands.61 Four of the cases
63
were straightforward.62 In In re Harris,
a lawyer received a reprimand for assisting her husband in the unauthorized practice of law
when the husband, who was not an attorney, used her office and staff to
close real estate transactions in which he acted, in effect, as the closing
attorney.6 4 In In re Davis,6 5 Michael Davis received the same discipline for his lack of communication and diligence in connection with two
habeas petitions which he was hired to handle.66 In In re Wright,67
another lawyer was reprimanded for failing to respond to discovery, to
comply with a court order, and to appear at a hearing concerning a case
that was ultimately dismissed; the lawyer also failed to inform his client
of the dismissal and lied to the Investigative Panel about why he missed
the hearing.6" In In re Adkins,6 9 Stephen W. Adkins, Jr. neglected one
matter and failed to communicate with his clients at a time when he was
He made restitution, showed
dealing with personal problems.7"
remorse, and received a Review Panel reprimand.7 1
A fifth case in which the court imposed a Review Panel reprimand was
more complex.7 2 In In re Syrop,73 the court began its order with the
understatement that the matter "ha[d] a complicated procedural
history."74 The attorney had filed a case for a client. The case was

59. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
60. Id., slip op. at 2.
61. In re Adkins, supra note 56, at 44; In re Syrop, No. S07Y0052, slip op. at 3; In re
Wright, No. S06Y1749, slip op. at 1; In re Davis, No. S06Y1436, slip op. at 2; In re Harris,
No. S06Y1158, slip op. at 2.
62. See In re Adkins, No. S06Y185 (Ga. Nov. 20, 2006); In re Wright, No. S06Y1749; In
re Davis, No. S06Y1436; In re Harris,No. S06Y1158.
63. No. S06Y1158 (Ga. May 17, 2006).
64. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
65. No. S06Y1436 (Ga. July 13, 2006).
66. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
67. No. S06Y1749 (Ga. Oct. 16, 2006).
68. Id., slip op. at 1.
69. No. S06Y2140 (Ga. Nov. 20, 2006).
70. GEORGIA BAR REPORT, supra note 56, at 43-44.
71. Id. at 44.
72. See In re Syrop, No. S07Y0052 (Ga. Nov. 6, 2006).
73. No. S07Y0052 (Ga. Nov. 6, 2006).
74. Id., slip op. at 1.
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removed to federal court, but the lawyer was not familiar with federal
procedures. As a result, the lawyer failed to respond in a timely manner
to discovery requests and failed to file mandatory disclosures. He
ultimately filed a dismissal without prejudice and a faulty withdrawal
from the case. The client retained new counsel and recovered on the
claim. As a result of a miscommunication between the supreme court
and the state bar, the lawyer was mistakenly suspended for a sevenweek period in 2004."2 The court ultimately ordered a Review Panel
reprimand for violations of the duties of diligence and communication,
and for the improper withdrawal in the underlying federal court case.76
Finally, the supreme court ordered that three lawyers receive public
reprimands. 7 One such sanction accompanied a suspension described
above.7" In In re Goldberg,79 the court reprimanded Ralph S. Goldberg for failing to take remedial action against his paralegal (who was
also his wife) when she acquired property being sold at auction to satisfy
his clients' judgment.8 " Goldberg had obtained the underlying judgment for the clients in a case in which he had a one-third contingency
fee agreement. The property was later sold to Goldberg's wife, and the
clients received two-thirds of the net proceeds of the sale, while Goldberg
retained the rest as his fee.8 ' In In re Taylor, 2 another attorney
received a public reprimand as reciprocal discipline for having received
a public censure in Tennessee for improperly withdrawing from the
representation of a client.8 3
III.

MALPRACTICE AND OTHER CLAIMS AGAINST ATTORNEYS

The Georgia Court of Appeals decided several significant cases
involving malpractice or other claims against attorneys.8 4 The issue of

75. See id., slip op. at 2-3.
76. Id., slip op. at 3.
77. In re Johnson, 281 Ga. at 675, 641 S.E.2d at 536; In re Taylor, No. S07Y0646, slip
op. at 1; In re Goldberg, No. S06Y1895, slip op. at 1.
78. In re Johnson, 281 Ga. at 675, 641 S.E.2d at 536.
79. No. S06Y1895 (Ga. Oct. 2, 2006).
80. Id., slip op. at 1.
81. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
82. No. S07Y0646 (Ga. Mar. 26, 2007).
83. Id., slip op. at 2.
84. Bonner Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Karsman, 285 Ga. App. 586, 646 S.E.2d 763
(2007); Young v. Williams, 285 Ga. App. 208, 645 S.E.2d 624 (2007); Paul v. Smith,
Gambrell & Russell, 283 Ga. App. 584, 642 S.E.2d 217 (2007); Chatham Orthopaedic
Surgery Ctr., LLC v. White, 283 Ga. App. 10, 640 S.E.2d 633 (2006); Cleveland Campers,
Inc. v. McCormack, 280 Ga. App. 900, 635 S.E.2d 274 (2006); Butler v. Gary, Williams,
Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperando, P.L., 280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d
614 (2006); Shuler v. Hicks, Massey & Gardner, LLP, 280 Ga. App. 738, 634 S.E.2d 786
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standing to recover arose in three cases,85 while several other cases
addressed the circumstances under which a client might be estopped
from complaining about malpractice because the client reviewed the
relevant documents.8 6 Causation of damage also came up several
times,8 7 as did the question of breach of duty.88 The cases also raised
several other issues.8 9
A.

Standing

The usual rule of standing in an attorney malpractice case is that
there must be an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and
the attorney.9"
In Cleveland Campers, Inc. v. McCormack,9 the
plaintiffs sold their business to Ballard, who was represented by
McCormack. When Ballard defaulted on his obligations to the plaintiffs,
the plaintiffs blamed the legal work that McCormack had done for their
inability to collect from Ballard. They sued, claiming malpractice.92
The trial court granted summary judgment for McCormack, and the
court of appeals affirmed.93 The court of appeals stated the usual rule,
that "'[a]ll that is necessary is a "reasonable belief" on the part of the
would-be client that he or she was being represented by the attorney."' 94 The court held, however, that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the existence of the attorney-client relationship
because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs paid a fee, sought or
obtained legal advice or assistance, or told the attorney that they were
looking to him for advice.95 The plaintiffs claimed that they told

(2006); Graivier v. Dreger & McClelland, 280 Ga. App. 74, 633 S.E.2d 406 (2006); All Bus.
Corp. v. Choi, 280 Ga. App. 618, 634 S.E.2d 400 (2006).
85. Cleveland Campers, Inc., 280 Ga. App. at 900, 635 S.E.2d at 275; Young, 285 Ga.
App. at 209, 645 S.E.2d at 625; Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 79, 633 S.E.2d at 411.
86. Young, 285 Ga. App. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626; Paul, 283 Ga. App. at 585-87, 642
S.E.2d at 219; Graivier,280 Ga. App. at 77, 633 S.E.2d at 410.
87. Bonner Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 285 Ga. App. at 590, 646 S.E.2d at 767; Paul,
283 Ga. App. at 587, 642 S.E.2d at 219-20; Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 78-79, 633 S.E.2d
S.E.2d at 411.
88. Bonner Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 285 Ga. App. at 590, 646 S.E.2d at 767;
Chatham Orthopaedic Surgery Center, LLC, 283 Ga. App. at 14, 640 S.E.2d at 637.
89. Butler, 280 Ga. App. 207,633 S.E.2d 614; Shuler, 280 Ga. App. 738,634 S.E.2d 786;
All Bus. Corp., 280 Ga. App. 618, 634 S.E.2d 400.
90. Cleveland Campers, Inc., 280 Ga. App. at 903, 635 S.E.2d at 276.
91. 280 Ga. App. 900, 635 S.E.2d 274 (2006).
92. Id. at 902-03, 635 S.E.2d at 276.
93. Id. at 900, 635 S.E.2d at 274.
94. Id. at 903, 635 S.E.2d at 277 (quoting Calhoun v. Tapley, 196 Ga. App. 318, 319,
395 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1990)).
95. Id. at 903-04, 635 S.E.2d at 277.
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McCormack's client, who was the other party to the transaction, that
they would rely on McCormack for legal advice, but there was no
evidence that the plaintiffs ever communicated this alleged fact to
McCormack. The only contacts between the plaintiffs and McCormack
before the closing were a meeting with an accountant to discuss
inventory and a chance meeting in the hallway of McCormack's office.96
The court of appeals declined to hold that a fact issue existed just
because the lawyer had not affirmatively told the plaintiffs that he did
not represent them. 97 The court of appeals concluded that although
the plaintiffs may have believed McCormack was acting for them, that
belief, under these circumstances, was not reasonable.9"
The issue of standing to recover for malpractice also arose in Young
v. Williams.99 A lawyer had been hired to draft a will in which the
testator would leave his residence to his wife. The will, as drafted by
the lawyer, did not have any provision relating to real property, and it
contained no residuary clause. As a result, the real property (the
residence of the testator and his wife) was distributed according to the
rules of intestate succession-one-third to the widow and two-thirds to
the testator's children from a previous marriage. The attorney admitted
he breached the duty of care when he did not follow his client's
instructions.'0 0 The trial court granted summary judgment regarding
liability, and the court of appeals affirmed.'0 ' The court of appeals
rejected the lawyer's argument that the plaintiff could not recover
because there was no privity of contract between the lawyer and the
plaintiff. 102 The court held that the wife was an intended third-party
beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and his client, the
husband. 0 3 Even though she was not the client, the wife had standing
to recover as the intended heir under a document that the lawyer
negligently drafted.0 4
A different theory of standing was raised in Graivier v. Dreger &
McClelland.'° ' In Graivier the lawyer had represented two doctors in
the creation of a limited liability company ("LLC") that would manage
a surgery center. The lawyer indisputably represented Dr. Graivier, one

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 904, 635 S.E.2d at 277.
Id.
285 Ga. App. 208, 645 S.E.2d 624 (2007).
Id. at 208-09, 645 S.E.2d at 625.
Id. at 209-10, 645 S.E.2d at 625-26.
Id. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626.
Id.
Id. at 209-10, 645 S.E.2d at 625-26.
280 Ga. App. 74, 633 S.E.2d 406 (2006).
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of the plaintiffs, but the efforts of Mrs. Graivier to recover against the
lawyer failed.' ° She sought to bring herself within the rule of Rogers
v. Hurt, Richardson, Garner,Todd & Cadenhead:'0 '
Even where no express attorney-client relationship exists, an attorney
may be liable for negligence under the theory of voluntary agent when
the attorney gratuitously undertakes to perform a legal service (or, in
this case, give legal advice) to another with the other's approval. Even
if only the corporation was defendants' client, it is reasonable and
foreseeable that the advice to transfer assets from the corporation to
plaintiffs, the individual owners of the corporation, would be relied
upon by the plaintiffs, not only in their capacity as stockholders and
officers in the corporation but also as individuals. The Georgia
Supreme Court has held that liability for professional acts extends not
only to the actual client but also to third parties who rely upon the
professional's advice in situations where the professional "was
manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and
intended that it be so used. This liability is limited to a foreseeable
person or limited class of persons for whom the information was
1 08
intended, either directly or indirectly."

The court of appeals rejected Mrs. Graivier's attempt to fit within the
rule of Rogers.'1 9 The court reasoned that it was unclear whether the
attorney gave her advice, and further, there was no evidence that the
attorney could have reasonably foreseen that Mrs. Graivier would be
relying on his advice in her individual capacity."0
B.

Estoppel

In several cases, lawyers tried to argue that they were not liable in
malpractice because their clients had read the relevant documents that
the lawyer had prepared."' Each relied on the holding in Berman U.
Rubin,"2 which did not allow a former client to recover against a

106. Id. at 79, 633 S.E.2d at 411.
107. Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 79, 633 S.E.2d at 411-12; 203 Ga. App. 412, 417 S.E.2d
29 (1992).
108. Rogers, 203 Ga. App. at 415-16, 417 S.E.2d at 32-33 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga.
131, 133, 356 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1987)).
109. Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 80, 633 S.E.2d at 412.
110. Id.
111. Young, 285 Ga. App. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626; Paul,283 Ga. App. at 585-87, 642
S.E.2d at 219; Graivier,280 Ga. App. at 77, 633 S.E.2d at 410.
112. 138 Ga. App. 849, 227 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
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lawyer for negligently drafting a document that the client had reviewed
and initialed." 3 The court in Berman explained its holding:
Our decision should not be read to state or imply that an attorney may
not be held responsible for his negligent draftsmanship whenever the
client can or does read the document. Indeed, where the document
requires substantive or procedural knowledge, is ambiguous, or is of
uncertain application, the attorney may well be liable for negligence,
notwithstanding the fact that his client read what was drafted. This
holding is simply that when the document's meaning is plain, obvious,
and requires no legal explanation, and the client is well educated,
laboring under no disability, and has had the opportunity to read what
he signed, no action for professional malpractice based on counsel's
alleged misrepresentation of the document will lie."'
All of the attempts by lawyers to use this doctrine during the survey
year failed.115
In Graivier v. Dreger & McClelland,"6 discussed above, the attorney
drafted an operating agreement for an LLC. The purpose of the LLC
was to manage a surgery center. The plaintiff, one of two doctors who
hired the lawyer to draft the agreement, claimed that the lawyer's
instructions were that the LLC would receive revenue only from
surgeries performed by doctors other than the two founders of the center.
The agreement was allegedly ambiguous on this point, and the other
founding doctor sued." 7 When the lawyer defended on the basis that
the plaintiff had read the operating agreement, the court of appeals
wrote that "[gliven the length of the operating agreement and the range
of rather technical subjects that it covered, we cannot conclude that Dr.
Graivier's failure to detect any error or lack of clarity in [the attorney's]
draftsmanship insulates [the attorney] from liability as a matter of
law."" ' This argument met a similar fate in Young v. Williams,"9
discussed above, in which the attorney negligently drafted a will that did
not provide for the disposition of the client's real estate or contain a
residuary clause. 2 '
The court of appeals in Young rejected the

113. Id. at 854, 227 S.E.2d at 806.
114. Id.
115. Young, 285 Ga. App. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626; Paul, 283 Ga. App. at 585-87, 642
S.E.2d at 219; Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 77, 633 S.E.2d at 410.
116. 280 Ga. App. 74, 633 S.E.2d 406 (2006).
117. Id. at 75-76, 633 S.E.2d at 408-09.
118. Id. at 77, 633 S.E.2d at 410.
119. 285 Ga. App. 208, 645 S.E.2d 624 (2007).
120. Id. at 208-09, 645 S.E.2d at 625.
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lawyer's argument that he was insulated from liability because his client
1
had read the will.

12

The estoppel issue arose in a more subtle context in Paul v. Smith,
Gambrell & Russell, 12 a case which made a return visit to the court
of appeals during the survey year. In that case, the lawyers drafted the
necessary documentation to merge two entities. The documents did not
contain a place for one of the shareholders to sign, despite a requirement
of unanimous consent in these circumstances under Georgia law.123
The shareholder whose name was omitted later sued the law firm's
client for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. In the malpractice action,
the firm's former clients sued the attorneys for negligently drafting the
merger documents, even though the clients had reviewed those
documents. 124 The court of appeals rejected the argument that the
former clients were estopped from complaining about the documents and
distinguished Berman:
In the case at bar, the true issue is neither the complexity nor the
simplicity of the merger documents but the potential effect of the
execution of those documents upon Destito and the jury in the underlying litigation. "Unlike Berman, the alleged negligence attributed to [the
law firm] in the instant case does not relate so much to a factual issue
as it does to the legal effect of the [merger documents] that appellant[s]
signed." There is evidence that the Pauls relied upon the law firm to
effectuate the merger in compliance with Georgia law and that the law
firm failed to do so. The effects of such a deviation from the standard
of care upon a nonconsenting shareholder cannot be said to be within
the Pauls' substantive or procedural knowledge as a matter of law. In
this regard, we note that Mr. Paul deposed that he remembered asking
Meyer how it was "going to play out," and Meyer responded that it did
not matter what Destito wanted to do because the Pauls were majority
shareholders. This testimony raises a jury question as to whether the
law firm's actions caused the Pauls' damages. 2'
The argument under Berman had failed again.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
Little v.

Id. at 210, 645 S.E.2d at 626.
283 Ga. App. 584, 642 S.E.2d 217 (2007).
Id. at 589-90, 642 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 585-87, 642 S.E.2d at 219.
Id. at 592, 642 S.E.2d at 223 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Middleton, 198 Ga. App. 393, 395, 401 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1991)).
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Causation and Damage

Claims against attorneys also typically require plaintiffs to show that
their lawyer's misconduct caused 12them
damage. 12 6 Issues of causation
7
cases.
and damage arose in three
In Paul v. Smith, Gambrell & Russell, 128 one of the plaintiffs' claims
was that the attorneys failed to prepare them adequately for their trial
testimony in the litigation that arose from the claims of fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment on
this claim because the plaintiffs had not put forth evidence that the
outcome of the case would have been different if the plaintiffs had been
prepared adequately. 29 The court of appeals agreed and affirmed
summary judgment on this issue.'3 °
The court rejected the generalized expert testimony which alleged that
the plaintiffs would have given more meaningful answers and not looked
evasive if they had been better prepared, and the court noted further
"
that the record showed evidence of preparation.13
' In the end, the
court searched for evidence of testimony that the plaintiffs would have
given if they had been better prepared and for reasons to believe that
32
any such evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial.'
Determining there was no such evidence, the court of appeals affirmed.133
Graivierv. Dreger & McClelland'34 also contained a causation issue.
Recall that part of the claim was based upon the lawyer's alleged
negligent drafting of an operating agreement for an LLC. The plaintiffs
claimed that the ambiguity the lawyer created caused them damage in
that they had to litigate over the intent of the document with a co-owner
of the LLC.' 5 The court of appeals agreed that there was a fact issue
regarding the causal connection between the alleged negligence and the
expenses incurred in that lawsuit.'36

126. Graivier, 280 Ga. App. at 76-78, 633 S.E.2d at 410-11.
127. Bonner Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 285 Ga. App. 586, 646 S.E.2d 763; Paul, 283
Ga. App. 584, 642 S.E.2d 217; Graivier, 280 Ga. App. 74, 633 S.E.2d 406.
128. 283 Ga. App. 584, 642 S.E.2d 217 (2007).
129. Id. at 587, 642 S.E.2d at 219-20.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 588, 642 S.E.2d at 220.
132. Id.
133. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 220-21.
134. 280 Ga. App. 74, 633 S.E.2d 406 (2006).
135. Id. at 78-79, 633 S.E.2d at 410-11.
136. Id., 633 SE.2d at 411.
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However, the court of appeals determined there was no such connection between the alleged negligence and other alleged items of damage. 3 ' Specifically, the court held that other litigation that involved
a buy-sell agreement did not involve the ambiguity the lawyer had
allegedly created.' 38 According to the court, the damages the client
had to pay in that litigation, the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings for
the LLC that followed, and the relocation expenses that the client
incurred when he had to move his practice were not causally related to
'
the alleged negligence. 39
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that
summary judgment on these items was appropriate. 4 ' The plaintiffs
were also unable to show damage from the alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty by their lawyer when he turned on them and represented their
business partner against them.' 41 Because the plaintiffs could not
show that the litigation would not have gone forward even
if the lawyer
14 2
had remained neutral, their claim for damages failed.
An issue of causation arose in Bonner Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v.
Karsman."' An attorney was sued by his former clients because he
allegedly was negligent when he drafted a construction lien and an
indemnity agreement. 14 The trial court granted summary judgment
for the lawyer on the claim about the lien on the basis of causation, and
the court of appeals agreed with this part of the trial court's decision.1 4' The court noted that another lawyer had attempted to foreclose the lien but failed to give notice to the clerk of court as required by
law.'46 Thus, it would not have mattered if the property description
drafted by the first lawyer had been perfect.'4 7 Any mistake he may
have made in the property description was not the cause of the plaintiffs'
inability to collect based upon the lien.'

137. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 410-11.
138. Id.
139. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 411.
140. Id. at 78, 633 S.E.2d at 410-11.
141. Id. at 80-81, 633 S.E.2d at 412-13.
142. Id.
143. 285 Ga. App. 586, 646 S.E.2d 763 (2007).
144. Id. at 587, 646 S.E.2d at 765.
145. Id. at 587, 590, 646 S.E.2d at 765, 767.
146. Id. at 587-88, 646 S.E.2d at 765 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a) (2002)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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D. Breach of Duty
In two of the malpractice cases, the court of appeals dealt with issues
related to breach of duty by the lawyer.'49 In Bonner Roofing & Sheet
Metal Co. v. Karsman,5 ° the lawyer had also drafted an indemnity
agreement in connection with the split-up of a business. The lawyer's
former clients claimed that he had breached his duty of care by not
ensuring that the agreement provided for personal liability of another
party. 5' The court of appeals held that because there was no evidence
that the lawyer had ever been instructed to provide for personal liability,
there was no evidence to show that the lawyer had breached a duty to
the client.'52 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of summary judgment on this issue. 5 '
Chatham Orthopaedic Surgery Center, LLC v. White.. concerned a
lawsuit in which a group of doctors sued a hospital association for
tortious interference with contractual relations. The hospital association
moved to dismiss for failure to verify the complaint, as required by the
anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute.'5 5 That
statute had a ten-day grace period, after which (without verification) the
statute provides that the pleading "shall be stricken."'56 Instead of
getting the verifications, the lawyer dismissed the case and re-filed it,
only to lose the second case because the failure to verify was determined
to be a nonamendable defect that required dismissal with prejudice. The
doctors alleged their lawyer committed malpractice when he failed to
have the initial complaint verified, when he re-filed the case instead of
obtaining the verifications, and when he failed to advise the doctors of
the risks associated with the strategy.'57 The court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment for the lawyer on the first two claims.'
The court
held that failing to verify the complaint did not cause any harm because
the defect may have been cured.'59 The court also held that the
decision to re-file rather than verify the first suit was not malpractice

149. Bonner, 285 Ga. App. 586, 646 S.E.2d 763; Chatham OrthopaedicSurgery Ctr.,
LLC, 283 Ga. App. 10, 640 S.E.2d 633.
150. 285 Ga. App. 586, 646 S.E.2d 763 (2007).
151. Id. at 586, 588, 646 S.E.2d at 764, 766.
152. Id. at 590, 646 S.E.2d at 767.
153. Id.
154. 283 Ga. App. 10, 640 S.E.2d 633 (2006).
155. Id. at 10, 640 S.E.2d at 635; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2006).
156. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b).
157. Chatham, 283 Ga. App. at 11, 640 S.E.2d at 635-36.
158. Id. at 12, 640 S.E.2d at 636.
159. Id.
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even though it turned out to be incorrect. 6 ° Because the law on this
point was so unsettled at the time, the lawyer was insulated from
liability.161
However, the court of appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment on the claim that the lawyer failed to advise the
clients of the risks associated with the strategy, given the unsettled
nature of the law.162 The court held there was a fact issue with
respect to "whether [the attorney] breached his duty of ordinary care by
failing to fully advise appellants about the potential
risks involved in not
63
complying with the verification requirement."
E.

Miscellaneous Issues Regarding Malpractice and Other Liability

Three other cases raised a variety of issues regarding attorneys'
liability to clients and to others.'6
In Butler v. Gary, Williams, Parenti,Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson
& Sperando, PL.,165 the court of appeals reversed a grant of summary
judgment for a law firm in a malpractice case. 66 A different law firm
filed suit for damages that resulted from an automobile collision, but the
defendant could not be found within the limitations period. The
defendant was eventually served by publication, and the plaintiffs hired
new counsel, the Gary, Williams law firm, to pursue the matter. The
new lawyers had several options open to them. They could have
dismissed the case and re-filed the case within six months of the
dismissal. That strategy might have enabled them to defeat a claim of
lack of due diligence in serving the defendant. The lawyers might also
have simply taken a nominal judgment against the defendant, which
would have enabled the plaintiffs to recover under the uninsured
motorist provision of their own insurance policies. The third possible
strategy was to continue trying to serve the defendant. This third
strategy is the route the lawyers took. When they finally purported to
serve the defendant, five years after the accident and almost three years
after the statute of limitations expired, the court granted the defendant's
16 7
motion to dismiss for failure to exercise due diligence in serving him.
In the malpractice action, the court of appeals held that there were fact

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
786; All
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 12-13, 640 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id. at 13-14, 640 S.E.2d at 637.
Id. at 14, 640 S.E.2d at 637.
Butler, 280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d 614; Shuler, 280 Ga. App. 738, 634 S.E.2d
Bus. Corp., 280 Ga. App. 618, 634 S.E.2d 400.
280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d 614 (2006).
Id. at 211, 633 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 207-08, 210, 633 S.E.2d at 616, 618.
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issues with respect to whether the Gary, Williams firm committed
malpractice when it did not choose either of the other two options of
dismissal followed by re-filing or a nominal judgment."' 8
In Shuler v. Hicks, Massey & Gardner, LLP,'69 a former client
brought an action for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty but
failed to attach the required expert affidavit. When the defendant
moved to dismiss, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging
fraud after the limitations period had expired. The trial court dismissed
the case, reasoning that the lack of an expert affidavit made the initial
pleading a nullity, such that the amended complaint after the limitations
period passed could not survive. 7 ' The court of appeals reversed and
held that the lack of an expert affidavit made the complaint subject to
dismissal but not void from its inception. 7 ' Thus, the plaintiff had the
72
right to amend to add the claims for intentional wrongdoing.
Although the plaintiff could not cure the lack of an affidavit, 173 the
plaintiff could still amend to bring the other claims, even if
they arose
74
from the same events as the original claim for negligence.
In All Business Corp. v. Choi,'17 an attorney acted as closing agent
for the sale of a business in which the seller of the business sold assets
that were covered by a security agreement with a third party. The
attorney held $80,000 of the proceeds for a period of time but eventually
delivered all the proceeds to the seller. When the third party, All
Business Corp. ("ABC"), could not recover its collateral, it sued the
attorney for breach of trust and conversion.'
The court of appeals
affirmed summary judgment for the attorney. 77 The breach of trust
claim alleged that the attorney owed fiduciary duties to the seller and
the buyer, including the duty to see that all liens on the property were
paid. 7 ' The court of appeals made short shrift of this argument,
noting that there was no authority for the proposition that a creditor can
recover for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duties owed to others, or

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 210-11, 633 S.E.2d at 618.
280 Ga. App. 738, 634 S.E.2d 786 (2006).
Id. at 738, 634 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 739-41, 634 S.E.2d at 788-89.
See id.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2005) (amended 2007).
Shuler, 280 Ga. App. at 740, 634 S.E.2d at 788.
280 Ga. App. 618, 634 S.E.2d 400 (2006).
Id. at 619-20, 634 S.E.2d at 401-02.
Id. at 618, 634 S.E.2d at 401.
Id. at 620, 634 S.E.2d at 402.
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that an attorney handling the sale of a business
owes a fiduciary duty
179
directly to creditors to discover their debts.
The court of appeals also affirmed summary judgment on the
conversion claim. 8 ° This part of the case turned on the attorney's
constructive and actual knowledge of ABC's security interest before the
attorney delivered the last $80,000 to the seller.'8 ' The court held that
there was no constructive knowledge because the financing statement
filed by ABC contained misspellings that made it "seriously misleading." ' 2 In addition, the undisputed direct evidence, in the form of
letters between ABC, its counsel, and the attorney, demonstrated that
the attorney did not have actual knowledge of ABC's security interest
before he disbursed the last of the money.8 3 The court held that
without constructive or actual knowledge of the security interest, the
lawyer could not be held liable for conversion of the funds."8
IV.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The Georgia appellate courts disposed of a number of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims during the survey period.' 85 To prevail on
such a claim, the convicted defendant must show that the attorney's
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
lawyer's deficiencies caused the defendant actual prejudice. 88 Prejudice in this context means that there must be a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the case would have been different if the lawyer had
not been deficient. 187 A failure to satisfy either prong of this analysis
results in the denial of a claim of ineffective assistance, and in fact, each
year dozens of ineffective assistance
claims are denied because they fail
88
one, or both parts of the test.

179. Id. at 621, 634 S.E.2d at 403.
180. Id. at 625, 634 S.E.2d at 405.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 624, 634 S.E.2d at 405.
183. Id. at 625, 634 S.E.2d at 405.
184. Id.
185. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007); Hill v. State, 285 Ga.
App. 310, 645 S.E.2d 758 (2007); Portilla v. State, 285 Ga. App. 401, 646 S.E.2d 277 (2007);
Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 147, 643 S.E.2d 556 (2007); State v. McMillon, 283 Ga. App.
671, 642 S.E.2d 343 (2007); Goldstein v. State, 283 Ga. App. 1, 640 S.E.2d 599 (2006);
Gibson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006); McCroskey v. State, 280 Ga. App.
638, 634 S.E.2d 824 (2006).
186. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga.
782, 783, 325 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1985).
187. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Smith, 253 Ga. at 783, 325 S.E.2d at 363.
188. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
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The Georgia Supreme Court decided three noteworthy ineffective
8 9
assistance of counsel cases during the survey term."
In Tillman v.
9°
Massey,
the court affirmed the habeas court's decision to grant the
habeas petition in a murder case in which the trial court gave an
erroneous instruction on the presumption of innocence.' 9' The trial
court instructed the jury that the presumption "'is for the protection of
the innocent. It is not intended to be a cloak behind which guilty
persons may hide."" 92 The supreme court held that this charge was
erroneous because it implied that the presumption of innocence does not
apply to guilty defendants.'9 3 However, because the lawyer failed to
object to the charge, the court concluded that trial counsel's performance
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.1 94 The court also
determined that this failure caused the defendant actual prejudice
because "the trial court gave an erroneous charge on a 'basic component
of a fair trial, . . . a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment[J' and permitted the jury to determine guilt from factors
other than proof adduced at trial."' 95 The defendant was entitled to
a new trial.'96
In Schofield v. Holsey, 97 the Georgia Supreme Court reinstated a
death sentence that had been vacated by a habeas court.' 9
The
supreme court stated that even if it assumed, without deciding, that trial
counsel had been deficient in not supplying certain materials to an
expert witness who could testify about the defendant's mental retardation, the defendant suffered no actual prejudice.' 99 In addition, the
supreme court concluded that even if trial counsel had been deficient in
the preparation and presentation of mitigating evidence about the
defendant's mental slowness, family, and upbringing, the evidence not
submitted would have been cumulative of what the jury heard."0
Finally, the supreme court assumed, for the sake of analysis, that the

189. Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007); Greer v. Thompson, 281
Ga. 419, 637 S.E.2d 698 (2006); Tillman, 281 Ga. 291, 637 S.E.2d 720.
190. 281 Ga. 291, 637 S.E.2d 720 (2006).
191. Id. at 295, 637 S.E.2d at 725.
192. Id. at 291, 637 S.E.2d at 722 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. at 293-94, 637 S.E.2d at 723-24.
194. Id. at 294, 637 S.E.2d at 724.
195. Id. at 295, 637 S.E.2d at 725 (alteration in original) (brackets in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1975)).
196. Id.
197. 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).
198. Id. at 810, 642 S.E.2d at 59.
199. Id. at 812, 642 S.E.2d at 60.
200. Id. at 813-14, 642 S.E.2d at 61-62.
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defendant's trial counsel had been deficient in his failure to develop the
theory that there was a "second shooter" involved in the murder." 1
Once again, the court held that the defendant suffered no prejudice in
light of other evidence introduced to show that the defendant had fired
the fatal shot.2 2 As a prelude to these holdings, the supreme court
expressly disapproved a long line of cases from the Georgia Court of
Appeals that had held that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors
should not be considered in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.20 3 The supreme court distinguished cases relying on cumulative
effects rather than cumulative errors by counsel.2"4
The supreme court decided another ineffective assistance of counsel
case by a 4 to 3 vote.20 5 In Greer v. Thompson,"' the defendant had
been convicted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. During the trial, it came to the court's attention that
someone had tried to bribe a juror to vote not guilty.20 7 Trial counsel
did not ask for a hearing to determine whether the State could prove
20 8
that there was no prejudice to the defendant from this tampering.
Nor did trial counsel move for a mistrial regarding the failure to provide
such a hearing, to state the reasons why a mistrial was appropriate, or
to ask for curative instructions.2 9 The lawyer also did not move for
a mistrial when the trial judge referred to the attempt to bribe the juror
as having been made "'to vote not guilty on behalf of the defendant."'210 The habeas court found that trial counsel had been ineffective in each of these respects and that there had been a sufficient
showing of harm.2 1'
The supreme court reversed and remanded for consideration of other
issues.2 12 The majority concluded that the trial court was not required
to hold a hearing concerning the improper juror contacts.213 The
dissent disagreed, arguing that Remmer v. United States2K4 required

201. Id. at 814, 642 S.E.2d at 62.
202. Id. at 815, 642 S.E.2d at 62.
203. Id. at 812 n.1, 642 S.E.2d at 60 n.1 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
204. Id.
205. Greer, 281 Ga. 419, 637 S.E.2d 698.
206. 281 Ga. 419, 637 S.E.2d 698 (2006).
207. Id. at 419, 637 S.E.2d at 699.
208. Id.; see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954) (holding that jury
tampering in a federal criminal case is presumptively prejudicial).
209. Greer, 281 Ga. at 419-20, 637 S.E.2d at 699.
210. Id. at 423, 637 S.E.2d at 701.
211. Id.
212. Id. passim.
213. Id. at 420, 637 S.E.2d at 700.
214. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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such a hearing. 215 The majority also concluded that the defendant had
not shown any actual prejudice from the way in which trial counsel
responded to the jury tampering because the juror in question testified
that the bribery attempt had not influenced his decision, and no other
juror testified to the contrary.2 1 The majority also refused to apply a
presumption of prejudice to this set of facts because the case was not on
direct appeal. 21"
The dissent argued that the habeas court had
properly found that there was actual prejudice because trial counsel's
failure to request the hearing had deprived the defendant of the hearing
to which he was entitled, and at that hearing, the juror who had been
contacted might have been removed.'
Finally, the majority determined there was no prejudice in the trial court's statement that the
bribe was for the juror "'to vote not guilty on behalf of the defendant."'219 The supreme court concluded that the words could mean
that the vote, rather than the bribe, is what would be "on behalf of' the
defendant. 220 The dissent noted that the habeas court had made a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not
move for a mistrial after this comment was made. 22' That finding,
according to the dissent, could not be disturbed on appeal because it was
not clearly erroneous. 222 Despite the sharp division of the court, the
habeas court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus was reversed, and the
case was remanded for consideration of issues that the habeas court did
not reach.223

The court of appeals decided eight ineffective assistance of counsel
cases that are instructive.224 Five of the cases concerned claims of lack
of diligence on the part of trial counsel.22 5

215. Greer, 281 Ga. App. at 424, 637 S.E.2d at 702 (Hines, J., dissenting)
Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30).
216. Id. at 422, 637 S.E.2d at 701 (majority opinion).
217. Id. at 421, 637 S.E.2d at 700-01.
218. Id. at 425, 637 S.E.2d at 703 (Hines, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 423, 637 S.E.2d at 701 (majority opinion).
220. Id., 637 S.E.2d at 701-02.
221. Id. at 426, 637 S.E.2d at 704 (Hines, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 423, 637 S.E.2d at 702 (majority opinion).
224. Starling, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695; Hill, 285 Ga. App. 310, 645
758; Portilla,285 Ga. App. 401, 646 S.E.2d 277; Johnson, 284 Ga. App. 147, 643
556; McMillon, 283 Ga. App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343; Goldstein, 283 Ga. App. 1, 640
599; Gibson, 280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204; McCroskey, 280 Ga. App. 638, 634
824.
225. Portilla,285 Ga. App. 401,646 S.E.2d 277; Johnson, 284 Ga. App. 147,648
556; McMillon, 283 Ga. App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343; see Goldstein, 283 Ga. App. 1, 640
599; Gibson, 280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204.
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In Gibson v. State,226 the defendant had been convicted of vehicular
homicide for killing someone when he allegedly ran a red light. The
defendant claimed that his light was green. His lawyers failed to
diligently investigate evidence that the traffic lights at the intersection
had a history of malfunctions that caused the lights to be green in all
directions.2 27 The court of appeals held that counsel was deficient by
not being diligent, and the evidence they did not pursue went to the
heart of the defense.228 The lack of diligence, therefore, caused actual
prejudice.2 29
In Goldstein v.State, the court of appeals upheld a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.231 The defendant
had been convicted of child molestation for the digital penetration of the
vagina of a seven-year-old girl.23 2 The court determined that trial
counsel was deficient in two respects.23 3 First, counsel knew that there
were numerous witnesses who were prepared to testify that the victim's
mother had a long history of making claims about molestation. Counsel
failed to call these witnesses and did not cross-examine the mother about
her many claims.2 34 The court of appeals held that the defendant
suffered actual prejudice because the evidence of the many other claims
was highly relevant to the mother's credibility and, indirectly, to the
child's credibility. 2 5 The court of appeals also determined that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to
present expert testimony.236 One of the State's experts at trial had
testified that deep digital penetration of a seven-year-old girl's vagina
could be, as the victim had described it, pleasurable. Another State
expert explained away the findings that the girl's hymen was normal by
testifying that the hymen in a girl that young is very flexible and
elastic."' Trial counsel stated later that it "never crossed his mind"
to consult with doctors to determine whether these opinions, of which he
had notice, were valid.238 In fact, as evidence at the hearing on the
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280 Ga. App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006).
Id. at 435-37, 634 S.E.2d at 205-06.
Id. at 437, 634 S.E.2d at 206.
Id.
283 Ga. App. 1, 640 S.E.2d 599 (2006).
Id. at 1, 640 S.E.2d at 600.
Id.
Id. at 6, 8-9, 640 S.E.2d at 603, 605.
Id. at 4, 640 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 6, 640 S.E.2d at 603.
Id., 640 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 7, 640 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 8, 640 S.E.2d at 605.
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motion for new trial demonstrated, the State's experts' conclusions were
highly suspect.239 Given the weakness of the State's case, other than
the opinions from these experts, the court of appeals held that counsel's
failure to seek expert testimony was deficient and caused actual harm
to the defendant.2 4 ° The case was remanded for a new trial.24 '
Johnson v. State,242 also concerned a lack of diligence in a child
molestation case. The defendant was convicted and appealed from the
denial of his motion for new trial.243 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded because the defendant had received ineffective assistance of
counsel. 2 4 The defendant allegedly attempted to have oral sex with
a fifteen-year-old girl and allegedly performed oral sex twice on her
fourteen-year-old brother while the defendant was employed at a
church.245 One of the acts on the boy allegedly occurred in the church
parking lot at a time when as many as three security guards may have
been patrolling the lot. 246 Defense counsel was given a substantial
amount of discovery a week before trial.2 47 He did not review this
material before trial, however, possibly on the mistaken assumption that
his motion for continuance would be granted.2 41 Trial counsel also did
not investigate the fact that the victims' family was seeking a financial
settlement from the church, nor did he try to find any of the security
guards who may have been patrolling the parking lot during one of the
alleged acts of molestation. 249 At trial, defense counsel presented no
evidence on behalf of his client. 250 He did not try to impeach any of
the witnesses on the basis of their interest in obtaining money from the
church.25 ' The court of appeals concluded that these deficiencies were
not the result of trial strategy, but instead were the result of counsel's
failure to investigate and prepare.252 As to prejudice, the court noted
that the case rested entirely on the testimony of the two victims, and
they had an unexplored financial motive. 25 3
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Id. at 7-8, 640 S.E.2d at 604-05.
Id. at 9, 640 S.E.2d at 605.
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284 Ga. App. 147, 643 S.E.2d 556 (2007).
Id. at 147, 643 S.E.2d at 557.
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Id. at 147-48 & nn.1-2, 643 S.E.2d at 557 & nn.l-2.
Id. at 151, 643 S.E.2d at 559-60.
Id. at 149, 643 S.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 150, 643 S.E.2d at 558.
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examination of the discovery material that counsel did not review
revealed material that would have been exculpatory and beneficial if
counsel had looked at it in time. 2 "4 The case was remanded for a new
trial.25 5
The other two diligence cases were State v. McMillon, 256 and Portilla
v. State.5 7 In McMillon the trial court had granted the defendant's
motion for a new trial because trial counsel had failed to investigate and
prepare an adequate defense. In particular, the lawyer failed to
interview the State's witnesses or obtain their taped interviews prior to
trial. He also failed to investigate whether the victim's death was an
accident.25 The court of appeals affirmed the grant of a new trial.259
Portillawas a direct appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion for
new trial. Appellate counsel claimed that trial counsel had not diligently
sought witnesses regarding a prior similar incident involving the victim
26 0
in Texas.
The court of appeals remanded for a hearing on effective26 1
ness.
Two cases from the court of appeals concerned claims that the lawyer
262
had insufficient knowledge to represent the defendant adequately,
while another expressed concern about a possible lack of communication.263 In Starling v. State,2 the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for shooting a neighbor and of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. The defendant denied shooting the victim, but one
witness testified that she saw the defendant shoot the victim. 265 The
defendant's credibility, therefore, was essential to his defense. 6 The
court of appeals held that trial counsel seriously undermined that
credibility, and thereby caused actual prejudice, because counsel did not
know enough to stipulate that the defendant was a felon. 267 The court
stated that if trial counsel had done so, the jury would never have
learned the following:
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Id. at 151-52, 643 S.E.2d at 560.
Id. at 152, 643 S.E.2d at 560.
283 Ga. App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343 (2007).
285 Ga. App. 401, 646 S.E.2d 277 (2007).
McMillon, 283 Ga. App. at 672-73, 642 S.E.2d at 344-45.
Id. at 673, 642 S.E.2d at 345.
Portilla,285 Ga. App. at 404, 646 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
See Starling,285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695; McCroskey, 280 Ga. App. 638, 634
824.
Hill, 285 Ga. App. 310, 645 S.E.2d 758.
285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
Id. at 475-76, 646 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 478, 646 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 476-78, 646 S.E.2d at 697-98.
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(a) that Starling stated on direct that "I had a receiving stolen property
and I had aggravated assault. I didn't have no weapon then. I did draw
blood and I got caught with a possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. And that was a small pistol. They took that," (b) that Starling
had committed a prior aggravated assault involving a gun (elicited on
cross-examination via Starling's admission to his guilty plea to an
indictment read to the jury and describing the crime), and (c) that
Starling had committed possession of a gun by a first offender (elicited
2 68
on cross-examination via Starling's admission to a guilty plea).
Thus, according to the court, counsel's lack of knowledge led to deficient
269
performance and caused actual harm to the defendant's credibility.
Because the court held the defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on
the aggravated assault charge.27 °
McCroskey v. State2 . also concerned a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel based upon a lawyer's lack of knowledge. 2 The defendant
entered non-negotiated guilty pleas to several crimes and received a
thirty-five year sentence. Immediately after the sentence was announced, the defendant sought to withdraw the guilty pleas. 2 3 His
counsel believed that the defendant had the right to withdraw the pleas
if he did not like the sentence imposed, as long as he withdrew them
before written entry of the sentence. 4 This had once been the rule in
Georgia, but that rule was overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court in
State v. Germany."' Trial counsel stated that he "'probably"' advised
the defendant incorrectly on this point of law. 276 The court of appeals
remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether the lawyer gave
this bad advice and 277
whether, but for the advice, the defendant would
have pleaded guilty.
Finally, in Hill v. State,27 s the defendant lost his motion to file an
out-of-time appeal. He claimed that he had lost his right to appeal his

268. Id. at 476, 646 S.E.2d at 697.
269. Id. at 477, 646 S.E.2d at 697.
270. Id. at 479, 646 S.E.2d at 699.
271. 280 Ga. App. 638, 634 S.E.2d 824 (2006).
272. Id. at 641, 634 S.E.2d at 827.
273. Id. at 638, 634 S.E.2d at 825.
274. Id. at 641, 634 S.E.2d at 827.
275. 246 Ga. 455, 456, 271 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1980) ("[A] defendant does not have an
absolute statutory right ... to withdraw a guilty plea, [sic] after the trial court's oral
announcement of the same.").
276. McCroskey, 280 Ga. App. at 641, 634 S.E.2d at 827.
277. Id. at 642, 634 S.E.2d at 828.
278. 285 Ga. App. 310, 645 S.E.2d 758 (2007).
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convictions because of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 9 The court
of appeals remanded the case to determine whether there was a failure
of communication.2 8 ° In particular, the court directed the trial court
to find whether the defendant was indigent at the time of his conviction
and, if so, whether trial counsel or the trial court fully informed the
defendant of his right to appeal and his right to appointed counsel on
appeal. 1
V.

A.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES

Attorney Fees and Attorneys' Liens

The Georgia Supreme Court decided one case during the survey period
283
concerning attorneys' liens.28 2 In Howe & Associates v. Daniels,
the court examined whether a duly filed attorney's lien could be
circumvented by the voluntary dismissal of the case to which it
applies. 28 4 The attorney who filed the lien succeeded in having the
trial judge vacate the dismissal, reopen the case to hear evidence
regarding his fees, and foreclose the lien.2 5 The court of appeals held
that this procedure was proper, and the supreme court affirmed.28 6
The court of appeals was also faced with a more complicated fee
case. 28 7 In Amstead v. McFarland,28
an attorney represented a
divorced father and mother in an action to recover damages for the
death of their son. The mother decided that she did not want to pursue
the case any further, and her attorney withdrew as counsel of record for
herY.289 The lawyer did not tell the mother that she would be entitled
to share in the proceeds of the case even if she chose not to be a
party.290 When the case settled for $325,000, the mother learned that
she had a right to a share of those funds, and after a hearing, the trial
court apportioned the money 75% ($243,750) to the mother and 25%
($81,250) to the father.29 '

279.

Id. at 310, 645 S.E.2d at 759.

280. Id. at 311-12, 645 S.E.2d at 760.
281. Id.
282. Howe & Assocs. v. Daniels, 280 Ga. 803, 631 S.E.2d 356 (2006).
283. 280 Ga. 803, 631 S.E.2d 356 (2006).
284. Id. at 803, 631 S.E.2d at 356-57.
285. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 357.
286. Id. at 803-04, 807, 631 S.E.2d at 357, 359.
287. Amstead v. McFarland, 279 Ga. App. 765, 632 S.E.2d 707 (2006).
288. 279 Ga. App. 765, 632 S.E.2d 707 (2006).
289. Id. at 766, 632 S.E.2d at 708.
290. Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
291. Amstead, 279 Ga. App. at 766-67, 769, 632 S.E.2d at 708-09.
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The remaining issue concerned attorney fees. The attorney had a onethird contingent fee contract with both the mother and the father. Onethird of $325,000 is $108,333, which is the amount the attorney sought
to retain despite the mother's motion to recoup some of those fees.292
The trial court found that the mother was bound by the contingent fee
contract, but the court of appeals disagreed.293 The court held that at
the time of the mother's withdrawal from the case, her attorney-client
relationship with the attorney came to an end. 294 At that point, the
contingency in the contract had not been fulfilled, and the usual rule
under these circumstances is that the attorney can only recover the
reasonable value of his services under the doctrine of quantum
meruit.2s" The court of appeals applied this rule to the case and
remanded for further proceedings. 296 The attorney was left with onethird of the father's 25%, or $27,083, and the prospect of further recovery
for the reasonable value of his services rendered to the mother before
their relationship ended. 7

B.

Contempt

298
The decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in In re Jefferson
sparked a vigorous dissent written by Judge Bernes. 299 The Juvenile
Court in Glynn County held an attorney in criminal contempt and
sentenced her to serve thirty days of incarceration. The attorney was
defending a minor who had been charged as a party to an aggravated
battery. During the delinquency hearing, the attorney encountered3 0a
hearsay problem, and the judge rejected her proposed solution to it.
The attorney responded, "'[Tihat's a gross interference with the way that
I can represent my client, Your Honor. ' ' 30 ' Later the judge told the
attorney that he had "'heard enough"' about the issue. °2 The attorney
then made the following comment: "'I just find the Court is biased in its
view. You say that you're not prejudging the case but it seems to me

292. Id. at 769, 632 S.E.2d at 709-10.
293. Id. at 770, 632 S.E.2d at 710.
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing Overman v. All Cities Transfer Co., 176 Ga. App. 436, 438, 336 S.E.2d
341, 342-43 (1985)).
296. Id. at 772, 632 S.E.2d at 711-12.
297. Id., 632 S.E.2d at 711.
298. 284 Ga. App. 877, 645 S.E.2d 349 (2007).
299. See id. at 881-85, 645 S.E.2d at 353-56 (Bernes, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
300. Id. at 877-79, 645 S.E.2d at 351-52 (majority opinion).
301. Id. at 878, 645 S.E.2d at 351 (brackets in original).
302. Id.
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like you've made up your mind and any and everything that I do to
effectively defend my client I'm being rebutted.""'3 3 The majority
opinion for the court of appeals upheld the attorney's conviction for
criminal contempt because her statements represented ' 3"'a
clear and
0 4
present danger to [the] orderly administration of justice. '
Judge Bernes dissented and argued that the two statements did not
constitute contempt.0 3 She found them to be uncivil but not contemptuous. 0 6 The dissenting judge noted that the attorney "did not use
any derogatory language or epithets" and that "there is. no evidence in
the record that [the attorney] had a disrespectful tone or demeanor. " "'
Judge Bernes pointedly quoted the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in In re Little08 and applied it to the present case:
"There is no indication, and the State does not argue, that petitioner's
statements were uttered in a boisterous tone or in any wise actually
disrupted the court proceeding. Therefore, the vehemence of the
language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish
for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger
must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil. The
law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be
sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate. Trial courts must be on
guard against confusing offenses 30to9 their sensibilities with obstruction
to the administration of justice."
Nevertheless, the majority prevailed, and the attorney's conviction for
criminal contempt was upheld. 31
The Georgia Supreme Court,
however, has granted certiorari and oral argument has been heard.31 '
The supreme court expressed particular interest in the question, "What

303. Id.
304. Id. at 879-80, 645 S.E.2d at 352 (brackets in original) (quoting Garland v. State,
253 Ga. 789, 790, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133 (1985)).
305. Id. at 881, 645 S.E.2d at 353 (Bernes, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
306. Id. at 885, 645 S.E.2d at 356.
307. Id. at 884, 645 S.E.2d at 355.
308. 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam).
309. In re Jefferson, 284 Ga. App. at 884, 645 S.E.2d at 355 (quoting In re Little, 404
U.S. at 555) (concurring in part & dissenting in part).
310. Id. at 881, 645 S.E.2d at 353 (majority opinion).
311. Supreme Court of Georgia, 2007 Granted Certioraris, http://www.gasupreme.us/
granted-certs/gc_07.php.
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is the proper standard for determining whether
a lawyer's comments
312
during trial constitute contempt of court."
C.

Fitness to Practice

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a certificate of
fitness to practice law in the case of In re Baska.3 13 The applicant had
lost his license to practice medicine in Vermont as a result of various
types of misconduct.314 He had engaged in a sexual relationship with
a patient for four years, had failed to follow the standard of care with
five patients, and had "evidenced unfitness to practice medicine by his
behavior with patients, their families, and nursing staff between 19982001."M' The Board of Fitness also found that the applicant had not
been candid when he said that he had never tried to hide after the
revocation of his medical license. The board noted a newspaper article
that suggested he had disappeared from Vermont and affidavits from the
Vermont plaintiffs' attorneys that alleged they had been unable to serve
the applicant with civil complaints. Despite recommendations from the
hearing officer that the applicant be permitted to sit for the bar exam,
the board denied his application for a certificate of fitness. 316 The
supreme court affirmed, noting that it was the applicant's burden to
establish fitness and that the board is not bound by the hearing officer's
recommendations.3 7 The court determined that the applicant's lack
of candor and his behavior as a doctor in Vermont justified denial of his
application.3 18
D.

Ownership of Client Files

Putnam County v. Adams 319 presented the Georgia Court of Appeals
with a set of issues concerning the ownership of client files. The County
used a private lawyer as county attorney for three years. A dispute
arose over the costs of copying the closed files, and the trial court
ordered that the County would have to pay for the copies.32 ° The court
of appeals reversed and remanded on the authority of Swift, Currie,

312. Id. A summary of the oral argument is available at http://www.gasupremeus/oas
/oct_15.pdf.
313. 281 Ga. 676, 678, 641 S.E.2d 533, 535 (2007).
314. Id. at 676, 641 S.E.2d at 534.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 676-77, 641 S.E.2d at 534.
317. Id. at 677, 641 S.E.2d at 534.
318. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 534-35.
319. 282 Ga. App. 226, 638 S.E.2d 404 (2006).
320. Id. at 226-27, 638 S.E.2d at 405.
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McGhee & Hiers v. Henry,3 21 in which the Georgia Supreme Court held
22
that documents in a legal file presumptively belong to the client.1
The court of appeals held there was no distinction between open and
closed files, and it extended the holding in Henry to include the
proposition that the attorney must bear the cost of copying any files that
the attorney chooses to keep.3 23 The court remanded for further
proceedings.324

E. Disqualificationof Public Defenders
The Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals each
decided one case during the survey period regarding disqualification of
public defenders. 5
In Burns v. State,326 the supreme court granted certiorari to consider
what the standard should be when a public defender claims that he or
she has a conflict of interest in representing a criminal defendant who
is represented by another public defender in the same office."' Two
men were indicted together for burglary and other crimes. They went
to trial together, each represented by a public defender from the Dekalb
County Public Defender's office. That trial ended in a hung jury.
During the trial, each lawyer made comments to the jury that emphasized that the lawyer represented only one defendant and did not care
what happened to the other one.328
Before the second trial, Appellant Burns's new public defender claimed
that these antagonistic statements created a conflict of interest and
sought to withdraw.3 29 The trial judge denied that request, and Burns
The supreme court noted that representation of
was convicted.
codefendants by one attorney is not always a conflict of interest and
declined to adopt any per se rule that would prevent two attorneys from
the same public defender's office from representing codefendants. The
court further held that, in the context of this case, there was no conflict:
Our review of the specific statements identified by appellant as
supporting his claim of conflict reveals that they do not evidence the

321. 276 Ga. 571, 581 S.E.2d 37 (2003).
322. Id. at 573, 581 S.E.2d at 39; Putnam, 282 Ga. App. at 227-28, 638 S.E.2d at 406.
323. Putnam, 282 Ga. App. at 228, 638 S.E.2d at 406.
324. Id.
325. Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006); Odum v. State, 283 Ga. App.
291, 641 S.E.2d 279 (2007).
326. 281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006).
327. Id. at 339, 638 S.E.2d at 300.
328. Id. at 338, 340, 638 S.E.2d at 300-01.
329. Id. at 339, 638 S.E.2d at 300.
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existence of antagonistic defenses between appellant and [the codefendant]. Counsel in these statements merely stressed to the jurors that
each attorney was focused solely upon representing his respective client
and did not care how the jury treated the other party. There was no
"finger pointing" in these statements: counsel did not argue or even
intimate that the other defendant was guilty of the charged crimes or
otherwise attempt to shift blame from counsel's own client to the other
defendant for the crimes. Rather, the statements mischaracterized by
appellant amounted to nothing more than mutual expressions of
indifference by counsel over the outcome of the criminal charges
against the other party. A careful review of the record in the second
trial reveals nothing that intimated, much less showed, the possible
existence of any antagonistic defenses between the co-defendants either
in the form of blame shifting or in the presentation of inconsistent
versions of the crime. In opening statements, cross-examination of
State witnesses and closing argument, both counsel pursued the same
defense strategy that their respective clients were innocently present
in the area of the burglary, no evidence showed they actually committed the charged crimes and no evidence showed the defendants knew
each other or acted together in regard to the crimes."'
Because there was no conflict, the court was able to put off for another
day the difficult, and potentially expensive, question of whether a
conflict of one attorney in a public defender's office should be imputed
to other members of the office to the same extent that a conflict would
be imputed in a private law firm.331
In Odum v. State,332 the court of appeals dealt with two issues that
arose when a public defender sought to withdraw. 3
The defendant
had been charged with several serious crimes, but he claimed to be
dissatisfied with his public defender. He also refused to meet with other
lawyers from the office.
The defendant eventually expressed his
displeasure by filing a federal lawsuit against his public defender and
her office, after which the public defender sought to withdraw. 334 The
trial court denied the request but issued a certificate for immediate
review, which the court of appeals granted.33 5 The court first interpreted the Indigent Defense Act of 2003336 not to divest the trial court

330. Id. at 340-41, 638 S.E.2d at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
331. See id.
332. 283 Ga. App. 291, 641 S.E.2d 279 (2007).
333. Id. at 292, 641 S.E.2d at 280.
334. Id. at 291-92, 641 S.E.2d at 280.
335. Id. at 292, 641 S.E.2d at 280.
336. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-1 to -128 (2004 & Supp. 2007) (amended 2007).
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of the power to disqualify public defenders who have conflicts of interest. 3 7 Second, the court determined that in this particular case the
trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.33
According to the court, the federal lawsuit created a significant risk of
a conflict of interest, and because disqualification would not delay the
trial, interfere with the orderly operation of the court, or be manifestly
unfair to the
client, the trial court should have granted the motion to
33 9
withdraw.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The appellate courts in Georgia decided numerous cases concerning
the professional responsibilities of lawyers in the survey year. These
cases provide useful guidance for lawyers as they seek to conform their
conduct to their responsibilities.

337. Odum, 283 Ga. App. at 293-94, 641 S.E.2d at 281.
338. Id. at 294, 641 S.E.2d at 282.
339. Id. at 294-95, 641 S.E.2d at 282.

